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Chapter 4 
 
The Structure of Mercantile Communities in the Roman World. 
How Open were Roman Trade Networks? 
 
Koenraad Verboven 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Trading systems are never random. The lone merchant, sailing the seas in search of lucrative 
markets, has little hope to rise above his station. Long distance trade depends on networks that 
link merchants and shippers to financiers, suppliers and clients. Merchants need to cooperate, 
negotiate and mediate. They need to put faith in commitments. The shape of trade networks 
varies depending on cultural norms and values, legal requirements, distribution of resources, 
but also on the personality, talent, acuity and ingenuity of the merchants themselves. 
The Roman world of trade offers examples of different types of networks providing 
different solutions to similar problems in different contexts. In this paper, I study three 
particular cases: late Hellenistic Delos, first- and second-century Puteoli, and second- and early 
third-century Ganuenta by the North Sea. Each is exceptional in its own way, but illustrates the 
wide range of possible arrangements.  
I will focus on non-family based co-operation and collective action in long-distance 
trading communities. My central question is when and why long-distance traders established 
professional associations, rather than rely on private networks or informal communities. Formal 
associations pool private resources and create new ones that are put under the control of the 
collective body and its representatives. The organizational costs are obvious: members have to 
pay fees, liturgies are imposed on officers, time is lost on meetings and ceremonies, lucrative 
partnerships with outsiders are discouraged. In turn, the potential benefits are equally clear. 
Guilds provide ‘club goods’ such as meeting places, storage facilities, financial support, 
network opportunities, and an internal justice system. Strong social ties and mutual trust among 
members are expected and encouraged. Meetings (often compulsory) provide information on 
market opportunities and on the reliability of potential partners. Misbehaviour is punished 
through social sanctions, such as public disapproval and shunning, that affect the transgressor’s 
reputation and inflict psychological punishment. Last but not least, guilds create new assets and 
resources, such as the status attached to being a guild officer or patron and the influence that 
goes with it. Public authorities can increase benefits—for instance by granting privileges and 
immunities, or using guilds as preferential suppliers—or on the contrary oppose the creation of 
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private associations. Whether benefits outweigh the costs depends on the specific institutional 
context that merchants face. 
My objective is to link up with research in late medieval and early modern economic 
history. Some of the arguments will be familiar to ancient historians, but they have not yet been 
cast in the research frame used by economic historians of later periods. By doing so I hope that 
the structural similarities and differences will become more apparent. 
Cooperation is the key to success in business, but is only possible if a minimum of trust 
is present. Businessmen need to put faith in future promises. Throughout history, household 
and family have provided the core units for business operations. Family members (in particular 
siblings) know each other intimately and share common values, social networks and (often) 
material interests. But family relations are limited in number and carry moral obligations that 
limit freedom of action. Kinship stimulates trust, but is no guarantee for talent. Brothers can be 
a burden as well as a blessing.  
Slavery and freedmanship enabled Roman businessmen to expand their operations by 
creating networks modelled on the Roman familia. The interests of slaves or freedmen and their 
masters and patrons coincided insofar as they belonged to a closed group with common 
interests. But closure also limits opportunities. Especially in the case of long-distance trade, 
independent freedmen may have preferred local business partners over distant ex-masters. 
Slavery and freedmanship only work well to maintain trust if they rest on real, rather than 
nominal, dependence.  
Business operations of some scale require cooperation between unrelated agents. The 
looser the bond between agents, however, the harder it becomes to maintain the trust needed to 
support cooperation. Trust becomes a question of institutional constraints. These may be 
informal norms, enforced through social and emotional sanctions (as in the case of amicitia1), 
or formal norms created and enforced through an external authority. In modern society, laws, 
police, and justice ensure that parties to a contract have an interest in not breaking it. Social 
sanctions can have the same effect if there is a consensus on the informal rules (the social 
norms) governing social interaction and if community members are able and willing to impose 
sanctions against members who break these rules. Social sanctions range from shunning and 
slander to exclusion from community events and places (such as temples or churches), and 
refusal to co-operate with norm transgressors. Having a reputation for unreliability can make it 
difficult (or excessively more expensive) to find business partners and agents. Reputation 
                                                     
1  Verboven 2002. 
3 
 3 
mechanisms, however, depend on the availability of reliable information, and on the presence 
of shared norms and values. For reputation to be effective in large or dispersed groups—such 
as long-distance mercantile communities—additional institutions are required.  
There are various ways in which long-distance merchants deal with these problems. They 
can, for instance, respond by congregating in culturally homogeneous groups, centred around 
group-specific cults, rituals and community events that symbolically distance the group from 
the wider community and from other merchants. Closed homogeneous communities offer a 
cheap solution to overcome problems of trust because formal institutions can be kept to a 
minimum (often ostensibly limited to religious purposes). However, it requires the existence of 
a distinct identity that segregates a specific mercantile community from other societal groups. 
It has the disadvantage, moreover, that it supports co-operation only between group members. 
Alternatively, merchants may rely solely on rules enforced by public authorities 
regardless of cultural or social specificities. Co-operation can then be left to private initiatives 
and fluid social networks that cross cultural and social boundaries. This, however, requires open 
institutions that are conducive to commercial interests, and public authorities that are able and 
willing to enforce these institutions. Such open access orders are expensive because they 
required elaborate formal institutions, but the costs are shouldered by public authorities and 
tax-payers. 
An intermediate strategy is to ‘design’ formal but private order institutions to govern 
transactions.2 Milgrom, North and Weingast analyzed the merchant law code and private judges 
of the Champagne Fairs as such a system that 
 
 works by making the reputation system of enforcement work better. The institutions … 
provide people with the information they need to recognize those who have cheated, and 
it provides incentives for those who have been cheated to provide evidence of their 
injuries. Then, the reputation system itself provides the incentives for honest behaviour 
and for payment by those who are found to have violated the code, and it encourages 
traders to boycott those who have flouted the system.3  
The range of private order formal institutions, however, is very wide. Guilds—or more 
generally professional associations—have received by far most attention. They are formal 
private order organizations, with explicit membership criteria, agreed internal norms and 
                                                     
2  Greif 2008 prefers the terms ‘organic’ and ‘designed’ institutions instead of ‘formal and ‘informal’; ‘formal 
organizations’ (such as guilds) are central to ‘designed’ institutions (such as guild charters). 
3  Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990: 19; for a critique Ogilvie 2011: 264–7. 
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officers endowed with the authority to enforce rules, to speak on behalf of the group and to 
exercise authority over its members. They express a collective identity and pool and create 
collective resources, available only to members as ‘club goods’.  
Formal associations usually graft onto distinct social or cultural groups, reinforcing their 
informal normative system. Without shared informal norms and values to underpin the group’s 
formal ‘designed’ institutions, a guild faces (prohibitively) high monitoring costs. The same is 
true, of course, also for state authorities: monitoring costs (police and justice) are high when 
public institutions lack legitimacy. Because mercantile interests often do not coincide with the 
(perceived) interests of other social groups and elites—especially in agricultural societies—
public authorities may face higher costs when they formulate rules favouring real or perceived 
mercantile interests rather than real or perceived interests of other groups. Consequently, 
throughout history, merchants have been faced with public authorities unwilling or unable to 
formulate and enforce rules that support their interests.  
Seen from a commercial perspective, the story of European modernity is that of the 
gradual creation of public order institutions that facilitated trade by laying down universalist 
rules regarding contracts, liability and enforcement procedures. This was a slow process, bound 
up not only with the formation of modern state institutions, but also with specific contingent 
policies and political agendas of national and local rulers. In most places, the medieval political 
system that relied on fragmented authority and guild privileges only slowly gave way to modern 
institutions. 
Do we find similar evolutions in the ancient world? The Roman Empire provided a 
common political and institutional order that transcended local polities, ethnicities and cultures. 
Roman and Greek intellectuals agreed that their way of life and welfare depended on local, 
regional and long-distance trade. But the Roman Empire was agrarian to the bone and its elites 
were predominantly large landowners. How did the imperial apparatus, local elites and polities 
respond to this reality? How effective were public order institutions to accommodate trade? 
What co-operative strategies did traders adopt in response?  
 
2. Medieval and Early-Modern Parallels 
Before turning to our three case studies to study these questions, however, we will look at the 
current state of research of mercantile associations in medieval and early-modern Europe. A lot 
of relevant work has been done in this field, with which most ancient historians are unfamiliar.  
The vast majority of medieval merchant guilds were local associations who received 
privileges from local rulers. They are a common phenomenon in the new towns of the massive 
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urbanization wave during the eleventh century. From the twelfth century onwards in some 
towns (but not everywhere) guilds of foreign merchants were established as off-shoots from the 
merchants’ home town guilds. Guilds gained considerable political power in European towns 
in the 13th century. Merchant and craft guilds often had conflicting interests and which 
prevailed over the other usually depended on local realities.4 In exceptional cases, such as 
Genua and Venice, a merchant elite so dominated a city that it could dispense with establishing 
a merchant guild altogether.5  
The debate on medieval guilds has been very sharp. The traditional view (going back to 
Adam Smith6) held that the legal monopolies established by and for the guilds damaged 
economic prosperity. Lack of competition caused prices to remain high. Innovations were 
blocked off, investments to improve efficiency were avoided. This view shifted in the 1990s 
when scholars began to argue that guilds protected their members from abuse by political elites 
and competitors.7 Although this protection was particularistic by definition Greif, Milgrom and 
Weingast argued that it increased the overall efficiency of medieval trading systems. The ability 
and willingness of alien merchant guilds to boycott rulers who reneged on their promises, 
propped up the credibility of rulers' commitments to protect merchants’ interests.8 Guilds, 
furthermore, reduced transaction costs by easing negotiations, stimulating the flow of 
information, and providing private order contract enforcement where public order enforcement 
was lacking or ineffective. This again boosted overall economic performance.9 Few monopolies 
in the modern sense existed and guilds were rarely able to enforce them but monopolistic 
privileges nevertheless provided stimuli for new investments and trade in areas that would 
otherwise have been avoided. 10  The ‘rents’ provided to guild members in the form of 
monopolies and other privileges increased their interest to obey guild rules, which in turn 
allowed guilds to play their protective role.11 
Sheilagh Ogilvie, however, vigorously rejects this ‘efficiency’ view. She argues that 
merchant guilds were not established to protect merchants against predatory rulers, but to 
                                                     
4  Soly 2008. 
5  Ogilvie 2011: 24–5; Mauro 1993: 259. 
6  Smith 1776: 170–1.  
7  for early guilds as protective organizations see Hickson and Thompson 1991; Mauro 1993; Volckart and 
Mangels 1999. 
8  Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 1994; see also Greif 2006: 91–123. 
9  North and Thomas 1973; Volckart and Mangels 1999: 440–2. 
10  Hickson and Thompson 1991; Richardson 2001; 2004; Stabel 2004 (but note that the discussion has mostly 
focused on craft guilds). 
11  Greif 2006: 104–5. 
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facilitate collusion between privileged merchants and ruling elites. Guilds relieved rulers from 
the need to create public institutions that would ensure universal access to markets and contract 
enforcement institutions. The monitoring and enforcement costs that the guilds thereby incurred 
were off-set by the high profit margins on monopolistic trade. In turn rulers incurred little or no 
costs in return for a predictable tax income (often levied by the guilds) and occasionally 
financial support when necessary. Guilds invested considerable resources in trying to enforce 
monopolies. Even if these were not effective, they significantly raised transaction costs for 
outsiders. The most successful trading systems in medieval Europe (such as the Champagne 
fairs) were those where local rulers refused to grant monopolistic privileges and instead 
committed themselves to protect the interests of all traders. Economic growth only took off 
when the power of the guilds was finally broken by the creation of public order institutions that 
offered protection and contract enforcement regardless of guild membership. Not coincidentally 
economic growth occurred first in countries such as England and the United Provinces that first 
side-tracked guilds as agencies of economic control.12  
Both models, however, pass over the differences in mercantile groups in medieval and 
early modern Europe. Only a minority of foreign traders established incorporated associations 
that received formal concessions or privileges from local rulers. Many of these included non-
merchants residing in the same place. In most cases foreign merchants and residents formed 
informal communities, tied together by common origin, traditions, feasts and cults. They often 
clustered in specific neighbourhoods, sometimes voluntarily (as migrant communities often 
do), sometimes because they were forced to by local rulers.13 Informal communities based on 
nationality or common religious beliefs provided and structured social capital, promoted 
solidarity, and punished norm deviance through social sanctions. The members’ specific social 
identity excluded outsiders. When a formal mercantile association was established, it always 
included social and religious functions and thereby either ‘incorporated’ a foreigner community 
or became organically and inextricably entwined with it.  
Gelderblom and Grafe conceptualize this diversity as a continuum along the lines 
suggested by Williamson: ‘At one end lies a perfectly atomized market in which anonymous 
buyers and sellers meet in fleeting encounters of voluntary exchange. At the other end, all risks 
and decisions are incorporated into one large hierarchically ordered and vertically integrated 
firm’. Between both ends lie endless permutations characterized by degrees of anonymity, 
                                                     
12  Ogilvie 2011; Dessi and Ogilvie 2003; for a general critique of the neo-institutionalist ‘efficiency’ approach 
Ogilvie 2007. 
13  See Mauro 1993 for a survey; cf. Ogilvie 2011: 94. 
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hierarchy, market control, and political involvement. Social networks, nations, consulates and 
guilds lay along this continuum as institutions governing transactions, differing in the amount 
of control delegated.14  
Gelderblom and Grafe propose to capture these differences empirically by focusing on 
five degrees of ‘control delegation’:15  
1. Individual agents: Merchants organize transactions without any interference of fellow 
traders. Individuals do not delegate any control. 
2. Informal constraints: Merchants are organized loosely along social or religious lines but 
have no formal economic organization. Control is not formally delegated, but social and/or 
cultural norms constrain decisions. 
3. Political representation: Merchants rely on spokesmen to represent them in negotiations 
with other groups or political authorities. Only control to represent is delegated. 
4. Internal discipline: Merchants elect officials to enforce general rules of conduct within the 
community. Members delegate control to establish general rules and enforce them through 
sanctions, but these do not include a formal prohibition to trade. 
5. Power of exclusion: The group is endowed with a privilege granted by a political body that 
gives it the right to exclude members/others. Members delegate control to be sanctioned 
through total exclusion from market entry. 
‘Control delegation’ is an ordered variable. Informal constraints may be present without 
political representation, which in turn can function without internal discipline, which itself can 
exist without the group being endowed with the power of exclusion. Conversely, however, the 
monitoring costs for groups in category 5 are so high that they presuppose the presence of 
internal discipline (category 4), of recognition and help from local authorities, therefore of 
representation (category 3) and cultural and social cohesion (category 2).  
Historians generally agree on the secular trend (with local and regional variations) 
whereby state institutions eroded the economic functions of guilds. The institutional framework 
created by early modern states obviated the need for protection against instability and predatory 
rulers (Greif 2006) and/or the opportunities for collusion between guild elites and political elites 
to make profits through monopolistic trade (Ogilvie 2001). The onset of modernity heralded 
the decline of merchant guilds as regulatory or protective agencies.16  
                                                     
14  Gelderblom and Grafe 2010: 486–7. 
15  Gelderblom and Grafe 2010: 491, table 1. 
16  It is ironic to find Finley 1999: 138 referring to medieval guilds to downplay the modernity of Roman 
professional collegia. 
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Interestingly, however, Gelderblom and Grafe found no evolution in the best available 
institutions before the seventeenth century. Competitive forms of organization 
(formal/informal, public/private) co-existed, with alternative institutional solutions being 
chosen to suit different political and market circumstances. According to Gelderblom and 
Grafe, guilds and rulers provided complementary goods/services, partly because strong guilds 
pressured public authorities to provide specific public goods, such as warehouses and exchange 
locations. The provision of ‘club goods’ that were otherwise unavailable or only available at a 
higher cost, continued to be an incentive to establish or preserve guilds for centuries. Their 
general decline became obvious only after 1650. Gelderblom and Grafe found little empirical 
indication that protection against predatory rulers was a major reason why merchants formed 
strong associations—as predicted by Greif’s game theoretical analysis. 17  They did find 
evidence that the possibility to extract rents incited some merchant groups to increase control 
delegation, but not enough to assume that this was the major explanation for the creation and 
flourishing of guilds. 
Guilds are formal associations, with clearly defined membership criteria and internal rules 
that require monitoring. Strong informal communities—based on homogeneous ethnic, 
religious or cultural groups, ‘with shared cultural beliefs and social norms but without any 
formal ties’— obviate the need for strong formal associations. Gelderblom and Grafe refer to 
the English Calvinist cloth dealers in Amsterdam in the later sixteenth century as an example.18 
Close-knit mercantile communities can inflict social sanctions that provide a low cost 
alternative to guild procedures or public law. Conflicts can be solved through mediation and 
arbitration, rather than by appealing to public order institutions.  
The Calvinist cloth merchants in Amsterdam used local contractual arrangements to serve 
as a means of last resort in case of dispute. But in homogeneous close-knit communities, 
business transactions are imaginable without formal contracts. Avner Greif distinguished two 
models of co-operation respectively based on collectivist values enforced through informal 
private order institutions, and on individualist values, enforced through formal public order 
institutions. The archetype of the former, in his view, were the Jewish ‘Maghribi’ traders in 
tenth-eleventh century Cairo. 19  The Maghribi relied on voluntary ‘coalitions’ between 
                                                     
17  Greif 2006 ; although it should be noted that the study by Gelderblom and Grafe may start too late in time 
(1250) to capture the early history of merchant guilds. 
18  Gelderblom and Grafe 2010: 490; cf. Mauro 1993: 266–74 for Jewish and Armenian merchant communities. 
19  So-called because they migrated from Tunisia to Fatimid Cairo in the later 10th century, although they 
originally had migrated from around Baghdad to Fatimid Tunisia in the 10th century; Greif 2006: 61; 
Goldberg 2012a. 
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merchants. Agreements were rarely formalized, but relied on the reputation of the merchants 
involved and the willingness of the Maghribi community to sanction breach of faith. The 
archetype of individualist traders, according to Greif, were the Genoan merchants, who 
cherished individualist values and distrusted each other too much to rely on informal 
agreements. Instead the Genoan merchants hired dependent agents whose trustworthiness was 
based on the rational consideration that the future benefits they stood to lose were higher than 
the profits they could reap from cheating. The merchants’ control over the city state of Genoa 
allowed them to develop efficient public order institutions to enforce contractual obligations. 
The organizational costs in the Genoan model were much higher than in the Maghribi model, 
but the Genoan trade networks were more open and flexible than the Maghribi ones.  
Greif’s interpretation has been sharply criticized.20 Goldberg re-examined the c. 1000 
documents of the Jewish Maghribi traders in the Cairo Genizah. She concurs with Greif on the 
importance of social norms governing business relations among the Maghribi, but argues that 
private order and public order institutions were complementary. 21 Informal norms and private 
order enforcement played a major part also in Christian Europe, while the Maghribi traders 
relied more on legal enforcement procedures than Greif was prepared to admit.  
Greif’s models, however, may still be useful as ideal types. Rather than mutually 
exclusive models, we can envisage a continuum between the two poles represented by Greif’s 
models and study the articulation of public and private order institutions. 
 
3. Roman Merchant Communities and Associations 
As in medieval and early modern Europe, we should expect diversity among mercantile 
communities in the Roman world depending on the institutional context in which they operated. 
Gelderblom and Grafe’s classification provides a useful framework to study this diversity. For 
operational purposes, however, we need to include an additional variable: material and 
immaterial ‘club goods’ provided by mercantile associations. Gelderblom and Grafe (2010) 
stress the importance of these but do not conceptualize them in their model because they assume 
that the degree of control delegation is itself a proxy for the relative value of club goods. Control 
delegation has a cost, which merchants are willing to incur only if it is off-set by the relative 
value of club goods compared to the value of available public goods, such as legal services, and 
goods available on the market, such as storage and hotel facilities. Hence there is no need to 
                                                     
20  Edwards and Ogilvie 2012; eliciting a sharp response by Greif 2012. 
21  Goldberg 2012a; 2012b. 
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conceptualize club goods as a separate variable. This assumption is no doubt correct but poses 
operational difficulties for ancient economies because available sources more often inform us 
on the existence of collective property and funds than on the degree of authority exercised by 
the officers of a merchant association. So, we here turn Gelderblom and Grafe’s assumption 
around: the presence of valuable club goods (such as collective property, funds, privileges and 
immunities) is a proxy for ‘incorporation’.22  In addition legal monopolies held by private 
persons are exceptional in the Roman world. The highest degree of control delegation, usually 
merely implied that guilds were able to exclude merchants from state granted privileges and 
immunities attached to guild membership. So I distinguish the following five levels of control 
delegation: 
1. Absence of control delegation 
2. Group specific informal constraints 
3. Delegated authority to represent 
4. Delegated authority to manage club goods ~ delegated authority to define, interpret and 
enforce rules on members 
5. Delegated authority to exclude from legal privileges and immunities 
I will now proceed by analyzing the three cases: Delos, Puteoli and Ganuenta. 
 
4. Three Ports 
Delos 
Delos had been a religious centre since the Dark Ages. It became a regional hub during its 
independence (314-166 BC),23 but it was only after Rome returned it to Athens with the status 
of a free-port in 166 BC that Delos became a commercial centre for the whole of the eastern 
Mediterranean. It maintained this status until it was sacked by Mithridates in 88 BC. Pirate raids 
and general instability in the following decades prevented its recovery, although it was still an 
active port in the late fifties BC.24 
Several foreign resident communities are attested on the island. The list of ephebes for 
119/118 BC shows resident foreigners from all over the eastern Mediterranean. Only 23 (out of 
                                                     
22  sensu sociologico—if not also sensu iuridico; whether collegia enjoyed universitas—the closest Roman law 
ever came to the modern notion of ‘corporate capacity’—is hotly debated. I am convinced they did (against 
Sirks 1991: 87–9, but as Duff 1938: 129–58; De Robertis 1971: II, 239–59; Aubert 1999), but will not discuss 
that question here. 
23  Cf. Reger 1994. 
24  Cicero, Att. 9,9,4 (hard to interpret exactly). 
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90) ephebes are Athenians, two are local Delians—together a mere 28% of the total. 22% (20) 
come from Seleucid Syria,25 19% from Phoenicia,26 3% from Phoenician Cyprus,27 6% are 
Romans. The large numbers from Syrian and Phoenician cities correspond well with the data 
from other Delian inscriptions. Tréheux lists 68 residents from Antioch, 35 from Laodicea-ad-
Mare, 66 from Berytus / Laodicea-in-Phoenicia, 31 from Tyre, 23 from Sidon, 16 from Ascalon 
and 12 from Salamis. Other foreign resident communities are clearly under-represented in the 
ephebes’ list. Egyptians, for instance, are conspicuously absent from the list, but other 
inscriptions document at least 47 Alexandrians.28 Only 6% of the ephebes are Roman or (non-
Greek) Italian, but this is misleading because freedmen (and slaves) are particularly numerous 
among the Romans on Delos, and they would by definition not be included. 
 
<FIGURE 15.1 HERE> 
 
Phoenicians undeniably formed a sizeable minority on Delos. Their communities had 
begun to grow in the late third century BC. During the island’s independence their organization 
remained largely informal, structured around a limited number of powerful families, such as 
that of Iason from Arados.29 During the first decades of the second century BC collective action 
by or on behalf of Phoenician communities increased. A mercantile group of Beirutian 
‘Warehousemen and Shippers’ (ἐγδοχεῖς καὶ να[ύκληροι]), who had their organizational base 
in their home town (ἐν Λα[οδικείαι] / τῆι ἐν Φοινίκηι) honoured the Seleucid official Heliodoros 
in 178 BC.30 A sanctuary ‘for the Syrian Gods’ (Hadad and Atargatis) was established in the 
first half of the second century BC.31  
Shortly after 166 BC some of these communities began to establish more formal 
organizations. The Aradians had formed a synhodos by c. 160 BC of which little else is 
known.32 In or shortly before 153/152 BC33 foreign merchants from Beirut and Tyre established 
                                                     
25  Sixteen from Antiochia, one from Apamea and one from ‘Syria’, one from Laodicea-ad-Mare, one from 
Nikopolis. 
26  Six from Tyr, three from Arados, three from Berytos, three from Ptolemaïs (Akko), two from Sidon; on this 
Ptolamaïs being ancient Ake, see Kontorini 1979: 40; Cohen 2006: 214–5. 
27  Knidos, Salamis, Karpasia. 
28  Tréheux 1992; cf. also Le Dinahet 1997. 
29  Baslez 2013: 229–30; for a later example see Le Dinahet-Couilloud 1997. 
30  IG XI, 4 1114. 
31  Siebert 1968; Baslez 2013: 231. 
32  ID 1543 = SEG 37, 691; Baslez 1987: 276; 1994: 30–1; 2013: 231. 
33  The first inscription (ID 1520) probably dates to 153/152 BC, but the associations may have been created 
shortly earlier. 
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two highly formal associations. The group that honoured Heliodoros in 178 BC34 created the 
‘Koinon of Beirutian Poseidoniasts, Merchants, Shippers and Warehousemen’ (τὸ κοινὸν 
Βηρυτίων Ποσειδωνιαστῶν ἐμπόρων καὶ ναυκλήρων καὶ ἐγδοχέων). Tyrians established the 
‘Koinon of Tyrian Heraklesiasts, Merchants and Shippers’ (Το κοινov τῶν Τυρίων 
Ἡρακλειστῶν ἐμπόρων καὶ ναυκλήρων). The guild of the Beirutian Poseidoniasts owned a 
large and splendid compound (1500 m²) with religious spaces, storage facilities, meeting places, 
and perhaps lodgings for up to 100 people.35 Its internal organization was based on a statute 
(nomos) that provided for elected officers (archontes). These included a president or 
archithiasitès) and treasurers (argurotamiai)), several priests. The statute also provided for a 
monthly assembly of (council?) members (thiasitai) during which reports by the officers were 
received and discussed, and decrees (psèphismata) were proposed, discussed and voted upon. 
Disputes were settled via internal proceedings before the archithiasitès, who could sanction 
transgressors with fines. The group’s activities were financed from its common treasury and 
through liturgies, but also through contributions, gifts and loans raised on the group’s behalf by 
a Roman banker who received elaborate honours in return. The association participated in the 
Apollonia—the great festival in honour of the Delian Apollo—and celebrated its own festival 
in honour of Poseidon/Baal-Berit.36 
The Tyrian Heraklesiasts established themselves as a formal organization around the 
same time. They relied on an assembly (ekklèsiai) of the wider Tyrian community (koinon) and 
a smaller council (sunhodos) of thiasitai that met on a regular basis. Elected officers included 
a president (archithiasitès), treasurers (tamiai), a secretary (grammateus) and a priest (hiereus). 
The group received land in ownership from the Athenian assembly to build a sanctuary for 
Herakles/Melqart that probably served for meetings of the sunhodos.37 Membership fees were 
paid into the treasury and officers had to perform liturgies.  
Although differing in details, both guilds were organized similarly. While catering to 
larger more diffuse groups of residents and affiliated non-residents, both were closed groups. 
                                                     
34  See in this sense Hatzfeld 1912: 157. 
35  The capacity of its banqueting rooms was between 68-96 people; on the ‘House of the Beirutian Posidoniasts’ 
cf. Bruneau 1978; 1991; Trümper 2002; Hasenohr 2007; Trümper 2011; see Harland 2013: 56 for more 
references ; see also the contribution by Steuernagel in this volume. 
36  Most information comes from the elaborate inscription honouring the Roman banker M. Minatius (ID 1520), 
but numerous other inscriptions (ID 1772-1796) found in the ‘House of the Beirutian Posidoniasts’ and 
elsewhere confirm and add to this. See Tod 1934; Picard 1936a; 1936b. 
37  On the distinction between the koinon and the sunhodos see ll. 7-8: διατελεῖ δὲ διὰ παντὸς κο[ι]/νεῖ τε τεῖ 
συνόδωι ; how exactly they differed is unclear; the ekklèsia (of the entire koinon) met in the temple of Apollo 
(ID 1519, l. 1) 
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Membership was costly but prestigious and offered access to valuable ‘club goods’ in the form 
of storage and (possibly) hotel facilities, meeting places, representation, protection of common 
interests and private dispute settlements and enforcement. It is striking to find that both guilds 
were established during the period of transition, when Athens had already established a 
klerouchia on the Island—whose members described themselves as katoikountes (residents)—
but had not yet fully integrated it institutionally in the Athenian polis.38  
Phoenician mercantile resident groups had shown a tendency to establish formal 
associations before. An association of Kitian merchants asked and received permission from 
the Athenian assembly in 333/332 BC to own land and build a temple for Aphrodite.39 Residents 
from Kition’s rival Salamis had a similar association in honour of the Syrian Aphrodite by 
281/280 BC. 40  Sidonians formed a mercantile resident guild in Attica (probably) before 
320/319 BC.41 We will see the same Phoenician tradition re-emerge in imperial Puteoli (cf. 
infra). 
Strikingly few other ‘nations’ are known to have established comparable formal 
associations on Delos. Even the merchants from Antioch, massively present on the island, seem 
not to have done so. The main non-Phoenician communities that may have developed a 
somewhat similar organization are the Samaritans and the Jews. The former—‘the Israelites on 
Delos who contribute towards the temple on Gerizim’—jointly honoured a benefactor in the 
late third or early second century BC. The name of the group implies that a collective institution 
existed to collect and ship the temple money. The intervention of the benefactor and the fact 
that the group was able to finance and erect an honorary inscription indicates that they had a 
meeting place, where they held deliberative assemblies. In the later second or first half of the 
first century BC the same group voted a golden crown to another benefactor.42 By that time, 
they may have been closely associated with the Jewish community, which c. 150-125 BC had 
bought a large compound and changed it into a synagogue. The size of the compound (c. 870 
m²) shows it served various community practices, rather than merely cult activities. There must 
have been functionaries responsible for the building and communal funds at their disposal.43 
                                                     
38  Roussel 1916. 
39  IG II², 337; Vélissaropoulos 1980: 101–3; Jones 1999: 40–2; 332 BC was an ominous year for Citium; an 
earthquake destroyed its port, but it was also freed from Persian overrule through the campaigns of Alexander. 
40  IG II², 1290; on the date see Osborne 2009: 87. 
41  IG II², 2946; Ameling 1990; Baslez and Briquel-Chatonnet 1991 (236-7 for the interpretation of the date ‘year 
12 of Sidon’). 
42  SEG 32, 809; 810 cf. Bordreuil and Bruneau 1982; Harland 2009: 113–4. 
43  Trümper 2004; 2011: 61–2; this is the oldest synagogue attested, but see against this Matassa 2007; the 
importance of the Jewish community (since at least c. 200 BC) is in any case beyond doubt, cf. Baslez 
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Unfortunately, however, we have no clue on how this/these groups was/were organized and 
what its/their relation was to the larger Jewish and Samaritan community. Jewish congregations 
are well attested elsewhere (even though later in time) and they obviously cultivated a very 
specific identity that segregated them as a group from mainstream Graeco-Roman society. This 
may have obviated the need for strong formal institutions. The Jewish custom to collect and 
send gold to the temple in Jerusalem, however, presupposes the existence of communal 
institutions to co-ordinate and supervize the operation. This must have the case also for the 
thriving Jewish community on Delos.44  
We have some information also on the Egyptian community. Around 200 BC Egyptian 
residents founded a sanctuary for Sarapis, where other Egyptian gods were also worshipped.45 
The temple had its own priest and personnel, but various other cult associations are attested in 
connection with it: the ‘Ninth-Day-Worshippers’,46 the ‘Tenth-Day-Worshippers’,47 the thiasos 
of the Sarapiastai,48 the koina of the Servants (therapeutai) and of the ‘Black-Garb-Wearers’ 
(melanèphoroi)49 and an unspecified club of eranistai.50 We do not know whether or how these 
groups were related, but they suggest the existence of different clusters inside the same 
community. The Sarapeion and its priest(s) may have acted on behalf of the community towards 
public authorities, and they may have exercised moral authority, but there is no indication that 
it exercised formal authority. Around 160/150 BC, however, an Egyptian synhodos voted an 
honorary decree for two benefactors, who received a bronze statue and golden crowns paid for 
by the association’s funds (ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων), as well as exemption from liturgies and 
membership fees. A copy was sent to the fatherland (patris) and to a sister association. 
Unfortunately, the name of the guild is not preserved but two other inscriptions (c. 145-116 
BCE) record a ‘Synhodos of Elder(s of the) Warehousemen at Alexandria’, which might be the 
same association or perhaps its ‘Mother-association’ in Alexandria. It seems, therefore, that this 
guild was either a local chapter of a larger organization or linked in other ways to similar guilds 
                                                     
1977: 203–6; Bruneau 1970: 480–93; 1 Maccabees 15,15–23; Josephus, Ant. Jud. 14,145-8; 213-6; ID 1586; 
2328-33; 2532; 2616. 
44  The Roman governor of Asia, Valerius Flaccus, prohibited the Jews from shipping gold to Jerusalem in 62 
BC (Cicero, Flacc. 67); Augustus and Agrippa expressly allowed this (Josephus, Ant. Jud. 16, 160-73), it 
continued until the destruction of the temple by Titus. 
45  IG XI, 4 1216; 1217; 1247; 1290; 1299. 
46  IG XI, 4 1228; 1229. 
47  IG XI, 4 1227. 
48  IG XI, 4 1226. 
49  IG XI, 4 1226. 
50  IG XI, 4 1223. 
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in Alexandria and elsewhere. They are clearly different from the Egyptian resident community 
on Delos as a whole.51 
We are relatively well informed of how the Roman community—the conventus civium 
Romanorum—was organized. It occupied a compound of considerable size, the so-called 
‘Agora of the Italians’. In the third quarter of the second century BC, collective action by the 
Roman residents’ community was socially structured through boards of magistri: the 
Competaliastai, the Apolloniastai / Magistri Apollini, the Hermaistai / Magistri Mercurii and 
the Poseidoniastai / Magistri Neptuni. The relationship of these to the Roman conventus is not 
clear. The Competaliasts are all slaves. Their name links them to the collegia Competalicii 
known also in Italy as neighbourhood associations. 52  The three other boards, however, 
composed of freedmen and ingenui, were more prestigious. Korneman, Schulten and Boak 
interpreted them as the (chosen) representatives of the Roman-Italian community on Delos.53 
Hatzfeld, however, rejected this and noted the similarities with the collegia and magistri in 
Capua and identified them as semi-professional / semi-religious associations, whose implicit 
raison d’être was to defend commercial interests. 54  Flambard further underpinned this 
interpretation. He argued that the Magistri Mercurii represented the oldest Roman merchant 
association on Delos, established c. 150 BC. As the community grew two new collegia were 
created c. 125 BC: one of shippers, represented by the Magistri Neptuni and the ‘Apollo-
Worshippers’, represented by the Magistri Apollini. The Competaliastai were established only 
towards the end of the second century BC.55 
Hasenohr recently reasserted Kornemann’s view. She believes that the magistri’s 
(formal) duty was to preside over cult-activities and more generally to manage the ‘Agora of 
the Italians’. She points to the absence of a reference to a collective body (such as collegium, 
synhodos) in the magistri inscriptions, to the often joint inscriptions by the boards and to the 
fact that family-members are found spread randomly over the Apolloniastai, Hermaistai and 
Poseidoniastai.56 These arguments, however, carry little weight. Joint dedications by collegia 
                                                     
51  ID 1521; 1528; 1529; Vélissaropoulos 1980: 112–3; Fraser 1972: 186–7, 320–1. 
52  Boak 1916; Flambard 1981; 1982; Mavrojannis 1995; Hasenohr 2003; 2008. 
53  Kornemann 1891: 50–61; Schulten 1892: 71–82; Boak 1916. 
54  Hatzfeld 1912: 146–76; cf. p. 162 for the identification as ‘semi-professional’, and p. 180 for the supposition 
that although primarily religious associations, their raison d’être was to defend commercial interests; on the 
links between Campania and Delos see Steuernagel in this volume. 
55  Flambard 1982; Hatzfeld 1912: 180–1 did not believe that the difference between Hermaistai and 
Posidoniastai was so clear cut. Flambard’s hypothesis presupposes a clear distinction between both merchants 
and shippers that almost certainly did not exist in the reality. See also Rauh 1993: 33–41. 
56  Hasenohr 2002; 2003; the agora has been variously identified as a slave market (Cocco 1970; Coarelli 1982; 
2005, a recreational centre (Rauh 1993), or a community-religious centre (Hasenohr 2001: 346). 
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are very common in Greek and Latin epigraphy.57 There is no reason why family members 
could not join different collegia. If Flambard is right that the Hermaistai and the Posidoniastai 
were functionally distinct but complementary organizations, spreading family members of 
various collegia would make excellent strategic sense. The absence of a term indicating a 
collective body conforms to the format of the inscriptions set up by the Capuan boards of 
magistri who certainly represented specific collegia. A Capuan inscription from 112 BC, for 
instance, mentions construction or repair works supervized by the ‘Masters of the Merchant 
Guild’ (magistreis / conlegi / mercatorum).58 The same guild is mentioned a few years later, in 
105 BC, as the Magistri Mercurio Felici.59 Roman collegia are explicitly attested on Delos in 
87 BC, when they pooled funds to erect a statue in honour of Sulla.60 These may have included 
the olive oil dealers mentioned in three inscriptions from 100-95 BC as a mixed group of Roman 
and non-Romans, 61  but they no doubt comprised mainly the Mercuriales, Neptunales, 
Apolloniastai and Competaliastai. We already mentioned that Roman freedmen were 
particularly numerous on Delos, but there were also a large number of ingenui residing on the 
island—such as the wealthy banker Marcus Minutius who helped to finance the guild house of 
the Beirutian Poseidoniasts.62 . If the Roman conventus had elected magistri, we would expect 
ingenui to have dominated these positions. This is not the case. Broekaert, furthermore, has 
shown that the magistri did not constitute an elite section of the Italian community on Delos. 
They came from a large and diverse group of families.63  
There is no reason, therefore, to doubt Hatzfeld’s and Flambard’s interpretation of the 
Boards of Magistri as representing separate social and religious associations. The 
Roman/Italian community as such did not have an associative organization. The collegia pooled 
resources, created institutions for collective action and put these under the control of their 
officers. They clearly structured social life in the Roman community on Delos, were probably 
                                                     
57  See for instance CIL 01, 02947 (p 930); Lindos II 300; IMT NoerdlTroas 74; IGR IV 790; the phenomenon 
is very common for the so-called tria collegia during the Principat: the collegia fabrum (tignuariorum), 
centonariorum, and dendrophorum; see Liu 2009 (passim). 
58  CIL X, 3773; cf. also CIL I², 682: conlegium seive magistrei Iovei Campagei. For other Campanian 
inscriptions mentioning magistri see Flambard 1983; see also the magister of a Roman collegium on record 
in Ephesus c. 100 BC (IK 16, 2074). 
59  CIL I², 2947; a joint dedication with the Magistri Castori et Polluci; note the telling cognomina of some of 
the freedmen mentioned here: Aerarius, Pera, Purpur 
60  CIL III, 7235. 
61  ID 1712; 1713; 1714; maybe also the Steersmen (ploizomenoi), although the inscription set up on their behalf 
is ambiguous about their collegial status: ID 2401. 
62      See above 
63  Broekaert 2015. 
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instrumental in managing the ‘Agora of the Italians, and presumably provided a framework for 
mobilizing the community when necessary. There is no indication, however, that they were 
elected or exercised formal authority over the conventus as a whole. 
However, while we find various forms of associations representing non-Greek foreign 
mercantile communities, it is striking to find no comparable associative institutions for Greek 
residents, merchants or shippers on Delos—not even for the large group of residents from 
Seleucid Antioch and Syria. As local citizens, Athenians and Delians would have enjoyed 
protection from their own law courts and public institutions. Apparently the other Greek 
residents were confident that they could rely on the same arrangements. 
 
Table 15.1:  
AT THE END OF THE SECTION ON DELOS AND BEFORE THE SECTION ON 
PUTEOLI 
 
Puteoli 
Puteoli was Rome’s main sea port during the late Republic and early Empire until the opening 
of Trajan’s enlargement of the Ostian harbour at Portus. It continued to be a major long-distance 
harbour afterwards.64 Its population was very diverse. Like Delos, the town was home to 
foreigner communities from all over the Mediterranean.65 The best documented is that of the 
Tyrians. Their first collective action is attested in AD 79 when the cult for the God of Sarepta 
(probably Eshmun) was brought from Tyre to Puteoli. Shortly later, the city council of Puteoli 
granted land to build a temple for the God.66 The community is best known, however, for an 
inscription set up in AD 174 by the stationarii of Tyre. It relates how the community had once 
thrived, allowing it to rent the most splendid statio in the city. Over time the community at 
Puteoli became smaller and poorer, probably because the enlarged harbour at Portus drew the 
wealthiest traders to Ostia and to Rome. For a time the statio established at Rome paid the rent 
for the building at Puteoli but around AD 170 this arrangement stopped. The group at Puteoli 
then sent an embassy to Tyre to request a subsidy of 250 denarii. During the debate in the 
council of Tyre, the alternative was suggested that both stationes would be placed under a single 
administration (ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ αἱρέσι). Unfortunately the inscription breaks off at the end. Sosin 
                                                     
64  D’Arms 1974. 
65  Camodeca 2006; Soricelli 2007. 
66  AE 1901, 151; Sarepta was an old Phoenician city, and still an active trading centre in Roman times, when it 
was controlled by Tyre, cf. Aliquot 2011: 85; for the cult of Sarepta in Puteoli see Lombardi 2011. 
18 
 18 
assumes that the group received satisfaction because the elaborate inscription detailing the 
events was erected in Puteoli presumably on the wall of the Tyrian statio. But we cannot exclude 
that the fusion did take place and the new administration simply wished to publish this.67 The 
relation between the community of Tyrians and those running the statio is not entirely clear but 
it clearly implied delegation to represent since one of the ambassadors who spoke on behalf of 
the ‘Tyrian residents at Puteoli’ (οἱ ἐν Ποτιόλοις κατοικοῦντες Τύριοι) was a stationarios. The 
letter he brought, moreover, was written ‘by’ the Tyrian residents (katoikountes). It also appears 
that the stationarii exercised some authority over the Tyrians at Puteoli since the community 
pooled funds to pay for the cult of their ‘paternal gods’ and to celebrate imperial holidays. In 
addition the city of Puteoli charged it with paying for the yearly bull-sacrifice at the city games. 
The stationarioi must have levied and administered these funds in addition to running the statio. 
Interestingly, the stationarii at Rome received income from shippers and merchants, while 
those at Puteoli did not. Why this was so or what for and on what legal grounds, is unknown. 
The debate in the council of Tyre shows that the metropolis had a considerable moral authority 
over its stationes abroad. Whether it had the authority to impose a fusion of both stationes is 
doubtful since the residents at Rome and Puteoli were clearly not on Tyrian territory. 
Steuernagel in this volume (see above, following Lombari and Sion-Jenkins) sees the stationarii 
as commissioners charged by the mother-city to manage the statio. The hypothesis is attractive 
but nothing in the inscription positively supports it. The text merely shows that the stationarii 
act on behalf of the katoikountes. Teixidor  believed that both stationes, at Rome and Puteoli, 
were under the formal authority of the city of Tyre. Ahmeling rightly (I believe) rejected this. 
The embassy and the petition it brought show that the mother-city was not, as a rule, involved 
in running the statio. The katoikountes were financially responsible for the rent, maintenance 
and management. The request for financial help was a call for help, which the city of Tyre could 
ignore or approve. Tyre is said to have ‘provided’ for two (trading) stations, one in Puteoli the 
other in Rome, but what is meant by this is not clear. It could merely refer to the ‘migration’ of 
the god of Sarepta, which had to be approved by the city council of Tyre.68 The Tyrians living 
in Puteoli, furthermore, had their own district (pagus) with representative institutions 
(presumably the stationarii, although maybe under a different name) that elected patrons. In 
                                                     
67  IG XIV, 830; Sosin 1999; Aliquot 2011: 88–91, no. 6 (and there for many more references); see also the 
contributions by Steurnagel and Terpstra in this volume. 
68  Teixidor 1980: 462–4; Ameling 1990: 193–4. 
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AD 150-200 (around the same time therefore as the embassy to Tyre) one of these, a Tyrian 
himself, donated a taberna with a ‘kitchen for cooking’ (culina cocinatoria) to the pagani.69 
The Tyrian community was not the only one in Puteoli that organized itself via formal 
institutions. Foreign residents from Berytus established a corpus in honour of Zeus Baalbek 
(Jupiter Heliopolitanus). It had statutes (lex et conventio) and owned a large terrain of almost 
1.8 ha (seven iugera) with cisterns and (work)shops, with exclusive access for members.70 
Is it a coincidence that the two best organized mercantile communities in Puteoli (as far 
as we know) are the same as we find two to three centuries before on Delos ? The letter of the 
Tyrian stationarii refers to other stationes in Puteoli but gives no further details. Other oriental 
cults and foreigner communities are well attested in Puteoli but no collective institutions. Only 
the Nabataeans appear as a clearly defined ethnic and cultural group but nothing indicates that 
they established formal institutions apart from the temple for their national god Dusares, which 
was built in 50/48 BCE and renovated in 5 CE.71 Only vague traces suggest the existence of 
other foreign resident groups. There was a sanctuary for Jupiter Damascenus that may originally 
have been founded by resident merchants from Damascus but no such community is attested 
and prominent Puteoleans were among its priests in the second century AD. 72  A vicus 
Tyanianus, mentioned in a graffito in Herculaneum may suggest the existence of a Cappadocian 
community.73 Another graffito documents a neighbourhood group of compitani Daphnenses 
(probably) from Antioch.74 The presence of a Jewish community under Augustus is mentioned 
by Josephus (Ant. 17.12.1; BJ 2.7.1). The Acts of the Apostles (Acts. 28.13-14) suggest some 
had converted to Christianity by the fifties AD. Unfortunately the sources don’t detail how the 
community was organised but there were no doubt common religious institutions. The Jewish 
practice of sending gold from Italy to Jerusalem via Puteoli is referred to by Cicero (Vat. 12). 
As in the case of the Jews and Samaritans on Delos this presupposes a minimal form of 
communal organisation and institutions. 
In contrast to second-century Ostia, only three texts inform us of collective action by 
Roman shippers or merchants in Puteoli. The first is an inscription found in the amphitheatre at 
                                                     
69  AE 2006, 314 = Aliquot 2011: 87–8, no. 5. 
70  CIL X, 1579; 1634, Tran Tam Tinh 1972: 149; Heliopolis (Baalbek) was under the political control of the 
Augustan colonia Romana established at Beirut, until it received independent colonial status from Septimius 
Severus, cf. Butcher 2003: 115–6. 
71  CIS II, 158; CIL X, 1556; AE 1971, 86; 1994, 422; 423; 2001, 843; 844; Renan 1880; Tran Tam Tinh 
1972: 141–3; Terpstra 2015. 
72  CIL X, 1575; 1576; cf. Bonsangue 2001: 207–9. 
73  CIL IV, 10676; Camodeca 2000; Soricelli 2007: 133. 
74  AE 1932, 71; Steuernagel 2004: 46, no. 170; Soricelli 2007: 133. 
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Puteoli in honour of a Divus (probably Trajan) by a group of navicularii working for the 
annona. They might have formed a collegium and used one of the rooms in the amphitheatre 
complex as their schola. But the inscription is too damaged to identify the group more 
specifically and we cannot relate it to a specific room.75  
In another inscription, from the Augustan era, merchants doing business in Alexandria, 
Asia and Syria (mercatores qui Alexandr(iai) Asiai Syriai negotiantur) honour a local aristocrat, 
L. Calpurnius L. f. Capitolinus. He probably belonged to a family with business interests in the 
East and may have financed the merchants honouring him but nothing suggests that the latter 
had established a formal association.76 
Thirdly, Claudius Aelianus has a fantastic story about a giant octopus invading a seaside 
‘house’ (oikos), used by Spanish merchants as a storage place.77 Baetican merchants are well 
attested in Puteoli and the story suggests that the arrangement to use a common ‘house’ as 
storage place was familiar to Aelianus’s readers. The merchants ran the establishment using 
slaves, but the no doubt largely fictitious story does not specify whether they formed a specific 
partnership (societas) or a merchant collegium, nor does it specify when the event supposedly 
took place. 
Contrary to Ostia, therefore—which is famous for its numerous merchant and shipper 
collegia (see Rohde’s chapter in this volume)—the Roman business community at Puteoli 
appears to have relied largely on informal social networks. How did this work in practice? The 
remains of the archives of the C. Sulpicii, three financial middlemen, provide us with a 
fascinating snapshot of Puteolean business life in the middle of the first century AD.78 The 
tablets mostly contain documents relating to loans or debts and trial proceedings. They mention 
273 persons, of whom only nine (3.6%) were not Roman citizens,79 228 are free men (83.6%), 
twelve are women (4.3%), c. 52% are liberti/-ae,80 23 slaves (8.5%). The Sulpicii were mostly 
                                                     
75  AE 1928, 120; Maiuri 1955: 54 (with an earlier date); Camodeca 1994: 114; Steuernagel 1999: 155; note that 
the amphitheatre had (at least) seven scholae used by collegia (Demma 2007: 73; Verboven 2011: 346. 
76  CIL X, 1797 = AE 2002, 348; on the interests of the Calpurnii in the East and their possible relationship to 
the mercatores as financiers see Andreau 1980: 914–5 (against Rougé 1966: 279); cf. Jaschke 2010: 119–20 
for further references. 
77  Claudius Aelianus, Anim. 13, 6; cf. Jaschke 2010: 119. 
78  The standard edition (with an excellent introduction) is Camodeca 1999; see also Andreau 1999: 71–9 for an 
introduction; the Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz published a thematic dossier on the Sulpicii in 2000. 
79  One from Tyr (TPSulp 4), one from Sidon (TPSulp 106) one from Alexandria (TPSulp 13; 14), one from 
Keramos (Caria) (TPSulp 78), one woman from Melos (TPSulp 60; 61; 62), whose kurios came from Athens 
(TPSulp 60; 61; 62) and three whose origins are uncertain (TPSulp 49; 80; 106). 
80  Verboven 2012: 92. 
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active as financiers or financial middlemen.81 The creditors range from imperial and senatorial 
freedmen, over a centurion to local businessmen and peregrine women. The debtors are long-
distance merchants. Many clearly lived and worked in Puteoli, but not all and some of those 
who did had their roots elsewhere.  
The tablets give little information on social relationships in them, beyond the obvious 
master-slave or patron-freedman bonds. The large number of freed persons is typical for Roman 
commercial circles and reflects the importance of the extended familia as the core of Roman 
private commercial organizations.82 The lack of clustering of names is consistent with the 
absence of formal associations, although it cannot be taken as positive evidence for this.83 
But the tablets are very informative about how the Puteolean business community established 
and managed trust. First of all, the tablets document the existence of a formalized system of 
information storage and retrieval. Besides financing trade and acting as financial middlemen 
and brokers, the Sulpicii provided a ‘notarial’ service. The importance of such services as trust 
supporting institutions in medieval and early modern Europe is well established. The Sulpician 
tablets show the same mechanism at work in Roman Puteoli.84  
Secondly, the documents illustrate how Roman law lay at the heart of Roman business 
culture. They rigorously follow the formalities we find in legal textbooks and show how Roman 
law served as an instrument to facilitate negotiation and coordination, thereby lowering 
negotiation and coordination costs. Thus, Roman law provided the dominant institutional 
framework to govern business transactions. 
However, did Roman law also serve as a contract enforcement institution? Procedural 
law did not entitle a plaintiff to assistance from public authorities either to summon a defendant 
to court or to enforce a verdict. Terpstra argues that Roman law was not in itself suited to 
enforce contracts since it relied on the willingness of contracting parties to accept litigation and 
carry out verdicts. It was an efficient way to handle conflicts only within local communities 
where social pressure could be used to force the parties to respect the law. Alien resident groups 
could fit in, but shippers and non-resident foreigners were outsiders and could not be 
constrained by Roman law. Long-distance trade had to rely on geographically defined stationes 
                                                     
81  There is strong disagreement on whether they were deposit bankers (argentarii) or ‘merely’ financial brokers. 
I have published my views on this elsewhere. The question is tedious and not relevant here; see Verboven 
2003; 2008. 
82  Verboven 2012 and there for further literature. 
83  Broekaert 2013 for a discussion. 
84  Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990: 6; see for instance Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal 1994, on the 
role of notaries for early modern credit, see also Verboven 2008: 224–9 for similar services offered by deposit 
bankers and various other categories such as proxenetae and pararii. 
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that provided non-resident traders with meeting places and local contacts where information on 
past behaviour of potential business partners could be exchanged. This supported a reputation 
based enforcement model. Norm deviance could be punished by exclusion from the statio and 
the services it provided.85 
Although Tersptra does not mention it, this view characterizes Roman law as an 
institution resembling Milgrom, North and Weingast’s description of the medieval lex 
mercatoria at the Champagne Fairs. This private ‘Law Merchant’ (lex mercatoria) laid down 
rules of conduct and procedures to record agreements and to provide third party judgement. It 
thereby supported private order reputation based enforcement, without coercive support from 
public authorities. Milgrom and his co-authors argue that this system was efficient even though 
the merchants were not from the county of Champagne and would return home at the end of the 
Fair, because they had a strong future interest in returning to the next Fair. A merchant who 
cheated or refused to comply with a verdict would be punished by exclusion. All that was 
needed was reliable information and impartial judgment by acknowledged experts, that is 
fellow merchants.86 This interpretation of the ‘Law Merchant’, however, and the role of the 
private judges, was severely criticized by Ogilvie, who argued that there never existed a 
universal private merchant law code. Ius commune (derived from Roman and Canon law) lay 
behind the private justice systems attested in most of western Europe. The application of this 
‘private’ law system was efficient only where local rulers were prepared to enforce it. Pure 
reputation based enforcement systems only worked within closed groups.87  
Terpstra argues that the business community documented in the Sulpician tablets was a 
close-knit community and could therefore rely on peer pressure and social sanctions to force 
contracting parties to accept litigation and to enforce verdicts. This, however, seems doubtful. 
A significant number of people documented in the archive were probably local, but not all. On 
the creditors’ side imperial and senatorial freedmen and slaves (and no doubt of local notables 
as well) acted as agents for their masters and patrons, who were investors, not (active) 
businessmen. The centurion mentioned as creditor (TPSulp 12; 26) was clearly not a Puteolean 
businessman. On the debtors’ side we simply do not know for most of the people involved what 
their origin or home base was. But at least in the case of the peregrini we cannot take it for 
granted that they were members of a single close-knit merchant society.  
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86  Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990. 
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Roman public authorities were closely involved in every step of litigation in private 
affairs. Judges and arbitrators were selected by the litigating parties,88 but they operated under 
the formal authority of judicial magistrates (praetores, provincial governors, or locally 
duumviri or quattuorviri iure dicundo), who appointed the judges and determined and specified 
the legal issues that had to be resolved. The magistrate could decree a missio in possessionem 
rei servandae causa against a plaintiff who refused to appear in court, which allowed the 
plaintiff publicly to sell the defendant’s property. Such a missio in possessionem was available 
also to enforce a verdict.89 While it is true that these only gave the plaintiff a ‘right of seizure’, 
they made it impossible for the defendant to stay in business or to use his property to raise 
money. Moreover, while a judicial magistrate was not legally obliged to assist a plaintiff who 
tried to arrest a defendant or enforce a verdict, he certainly had the discretionary power to do 
so. Why would local or imperial officials in Italy have refused their co-operation? Local 
magistrates were elected officials. The tablets document the traditional ‘formulary procedure’, 
which remained in use in Italy until the third century AD. Since Augustus, however, an 
alternative cognitio extraordinaria had developed in which public authorities did take charge 
of summons and enforcement of verdict. This procedure was common in the provinces, but only 
became dominant in Italy in the third century AD. Nevertheless, its development does indicate 
an acknowledgment on the part of the state of its role in the provision of justice. 
Roman law, moreover, was not the only way that the state accommodated merchants. 
Public and privately owned warehouses offered storage facilities for rent to overseas traders. 
Several of the Sulpician tablets refer to storage space being rented by merchants. These 
warehouses rented out storage space at market prices, but the state supervized the exploitation 
and lease contracts. So, if Claudius’ Aelianus story has any historicity, the merchants in 
question at least were not obliged to use the storage space offered in the ‘House of the Spanish 
Merchants’. 
So, although ethnically based guilds played some part in the practices of long-distance 
trade at Puteoli, open access institutions were readily available and supported individual 
business strategies based on voluntary social networks that potentially cut through geographic 
and cultural lines. The contrast with second century Ostia and Portus—where merchant and 
shipper guilds are abundantly documented—is of course striking. It is likely that the same 
merchant and shippers who sailed to Portus, sailed also to Puteoli. The absence of guilds in 
                                                     
88  See Brokaert 2016. 
89  Kaser 1996: 427–32. 
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second-century Puteoli may, therefore, be misleading, but the situation here suggests that the 
prominence of long-distance trade guilds at Ostia and Portus was due to the particular 
organization of the new imperial port administration, specifically of the Annona—not to 
inefficiency on the part of public authorities. 
 
Table 15.2: AT THE END OF THE SECTION ON PUTEOLI 
 
Ganuenta 
Delos and Puteoli were situated in the Mediterranean core of the Empire. But long-distance 
trade stretched far beyond. Little is known of the original context of the altars for the goddess 
Nehalennia that were found on the beach at Domburg and under water in the Eastern Scheldt 
near the village of Colijnsplaat, approximately 25 km to the east. Clearly the monuments derive 
from the same merchant group(s). One of the sunken altars shows that the site, situated on the 
southern shore of the Scheldt estuary in the territory of the Menapii, was named Ganuenta.90 
Nucleated civilian settlements (vici) are rare in the northern part of the civitas Menapiorum. 
While this area had become more densely populated in the second century, it was still 
characterized by peasant agriculture and extensive cattle-raising. So, Ganuenta may well have 
been merely a trading post or a small military outpost.  
The civitas belonged to the province of Gallia Belgica, but the coastline formed a single 
military zone with that of Germania Inferior, north of the Scheldt estuary. The area saw 
intensive military action in the AD 170s due to the incursion of the Chauci, and may have 
continued to be unruly until the Severan emperors. There was a seaside fort at Walcheren-
Roompot, a location only a few kilometres from Domburg and Colijnsplaat. The military camps 
at Aardenburg (45 km from Ganuenta/Colijnsplaat) and Oudenburg (75 km) provided inland 
support.91 
As a trading post, Ganuenta was important mainly for connecting the Rhine area and the 
civitates of the Tungri (via the Meuse river basin) and the Nervii and Menapii (via the Scheldt 
river basin) to the North Sea. Goods could here be transferred from river barges to sea-going 
vessels for transport to Britain and Northern France and vice versa.92 Whether it was the only 
                                                     
90  Stuart and Bogaers 2001: B 50: Deae Neha[le]/niae / Gimio Ga/nuent(ae) cons(istens) / v(otum) s(olvit) 
l(ibens) m(erito); Bogaers wrongly assumed that Ganuenta was the capital of the Frisiavones, north of the 
Scheldt; cf. Bogaers and Gysseling 1971; Stuart and Bogaers 2001; Vos and van Heeringen 1997. 
91  De Clercq 2009: 379–92; tiles with military inscriptions were washed up at De Roompot and a 17th century 
map refers to a ‘Roman castle;’ cf. De Clercq 2009: 392, Dhaeze 2009: 1234–5. 
92  Besuijen and Siemons 2012: 140; cf. the relief of a river boat on Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 8. 
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such port, cannot be known, but considering the size of the trade network documented at 
Ganuenta, it must have been an important one. 
The Nehalennia altars cannot be dated more closely than 150-250 CE, but the 
predominance of dedicants with the tria nomina (rather than duo nomina),93 the variety of 
gentilicia, the presence of significant numbers of non-Romans (see below), and the virtual 
absence of the name Aurelius94 suggests that the majority of the monuments date to the second 
century. Seven dedicants bear the name Iulius, which implies that their families had enjoyed 
Roman citizenship since before AD 43.95  
Two hundred persons are documented on the altars. The names of 133 of them are at least 
partially preserved. The geographic reach of the Ganuenta merchants is impressive.96 Most 
came from nearby Germania Inferior or Belgica: one from the municipium Batavorum (capital 
Noviomagus (Nijmegen)),97 four to-eight from Cologne,98 four were Treveri,99 up to seventeen 
may have been Tungri,100 but there was also one from the Veliocasses (capital Rotomagus 
(Rouen)),101 one from the Sequani (capital Vesontio (Besançon),102 one from Durnomagus 
(Dormagen),103 and one from the Rauraci (capital Augusta Rauricorum (Augst)).104  Some 
specify where they did business. Four present themselves as negotiatores Britanniciani.105 
Another identifies himself as a negotiator Cantianus et Geserecanus—active on the Channel 
                                                     
93  Peregrines could adopt Roman names of course, but few would take the full tria nomina when (by the later 
second century) the duo nomina had become customary; the comparison with Iunian Latins made by Llewelyn 
1992: 150–1 is irrelevant since this status would only exist for freedmen of Roman citizens. 
94  Only one: C. Aurelius Verus (Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 11 = A 37), but the praenomen indicates that he 
did not assume this name after receiving citizenship via the Constitutio Antoniniana ; CIL XIII, 8164a shows 
that he was a freedman (C(ai) l(ibertus)) 
95  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, B 8 (T. Iulius Tacitus); A 59 (Sex. Iulius Vitalis); A 52 (C. Iulius Primitivus); A 4 
(Q. Iulius Frontinus); A 5 (C. Iulius Aprilis); A 49 (C. Iulius Ianuarius); A 26 (C. Iulius Florentinus); Iulius 
is the most common name, followed by Tertinius (four persons); there are three Sentii but two of these are 
named in the same inscription; no other name occurs more than twice. 
96  See Stuart and Bogaers 2001: 32–3. 
97  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, B 63 = B 74 = C 6 = C 17. 
98  Two are certain: Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 26 and A 49; for the others see ibid.: 32-3; one is a citizen from 
Trier doing business in Cologne (C. Exgingius Agricola A 49). 
99  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 1; B 44; 45. 
100  This figure is uncertain, since it is based solely on the type of stone used for a number of altars coming from 
quarries near Namur in the Civitas Tungrorum; Stuart and Bogaers 2001: 45–8. 
101  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 6. 
102  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 57. 
103  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, B 30; a soldier sesquiplicarius who served in the Ala Noricorum, stationed in 
Durnomagus. 
104  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 41. 
105  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 3; A 6 (recorded also in Eburacum: RIB 3, 3195); A 11 = A 37; B 10. 
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route from Boulogne-sur-Mer to Dover. 106  Perhaps we should add also L. Solimarius 
Secundinus, a citizen from Trier, who died at Burdigala (Bordeaux) around the middle of the 
second century AD and is recorded there as negotiator Britannicianus.107 One merchant from 
Trier exported salt from Ganuenta to Cologne.108  
The social status of the dedicants varied. One was decurio of the Batavi,109 another was 
sevir augustalis of the Rauraci.110 Five were certainly Roman citizens,111 94 others have Roman 
type names (either the full tria nomina or the duo nomina), suggesting that they came from 
civitates with Latin or full Roman status. At least twenty, however, had non-Roman names out 
of 119 (17%) whose names are preserved well enough to ascertain name-status. Only two 
mention freedman status112 but presumably there were more freedmen among them. In one case, 
we may see a promotion from peregrine status to Roman (or Latin) status, viz. for Placidus, son 
of Viducius, from the Veliocasses, who is mentioned as L. Viducius [Viduci f(ilius) Pla]cidus 
in Eburacum.113 
Fourteen specify that they were negotiatores, four others thank the Goddess for having 
preserved their trade wares (ob merces conservatas).114 One was a barge skipper (nauta) from 
the Sequani, where the powerful guild of Nautae Ararici, the barge skippers on the Saône, were 
active. Presumably he traded along the Saône, Moselle and Rhine route.115 One inscription is 
dedicated by a ship captain (actor navis), who also mentions the ship’s owner (dominus 
navis).116 One was an agent (agens rem adiutor).117 One is named Mercatorius Amabilis. He 
set up an altar ‘for his ships’ (pro navibus).118 Nearly all the altars were erected in fulfillment 
of vows. Seven inscriptions specify this was ‘for safekeeping the merchandise’119 and one for 
                                                     
106  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 9. 
107  CIL XIII, 634 
108  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 1: civ<i=E>s Trever / negotiator / salarius / c(oloniae) C(laudiae) A(rae) 
A(grippinensium). 
109  Q. Phoebius Hilarus, Stuart and Bogaers 2001, B 37; B 63. 
110  [---] Marcellus, Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 41. 
111  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 5 (a veteran); A 26; A 49 (citizens of Cologne); B 37; 63 (the decurio of the 
Batavi mentioned above); B 30 (a soldier sesquiplicarius). 
112  CIL XIII, 8787; Stuart and Bogaers 2001, B 10. 
113  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 6; RIB 3, 3195; or are they father and son? 
114  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 42 (name lost); A 62 (name lost); B 3 (C. Crescentius Florus); B 37; B 63 (Q. 
Phoebius Hilarus). 
115  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 57 (Vegisonius Martinus). 
116  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, B 38 (Bosiconius Quartus, actor navis for Florius Severus).  
117  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 29 (M. Cupitius Victor). 
118  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, B 2; 4. 
119  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 3; A 9; A 42; A 62; B 10; B 37. 
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a prosperous venture (ob meliores actus).120 Other dedicants had a military background. One 
was a sesquiplicarius from the Ala Noricorum (stationed at Cologne in the second century).121 
One was a beneficiarius consularis,122 another was a veteran beneficiarius consularis.123 How 
or whether these military men were related to the merchant community (perhaps as financiers 
or customers) is not clear. 
The Nehalennia altars show a sense of shared identity. Some of them invoke their identity 
as negotiatores Britanniciani. Von Petrikovits interpreted this as signifying a professional 
collegium.124  Nothing in the inscriptions, however, suggests collective action by a formal 
association. The different background and social status of the traders makes it unlikely that they 
would have established a single formal association. Each was connected to different domestic 
trade networks. The absence of clustering may be inferred also from the absence of clustering 
in gentilicia. Of the 84 gentilicia attested, only two occur four times or more: Tertinia (5x) and 
Iulia (7x). 
The mercantile community at Ganuenta was no doubt structured in some way but there is 
no indication that it was organized as a formal voluntary association. The sanctuary and cult for 
Nehalennia provided opportunities for collective action by the resident merchant community. 
It may also have represented the interests of merchants and their agents. Neither service, 
however, appears to have been formalized and the temple certainly did not exercise control over 
the merchant community. 
The Ganuenta trading network differed geographically from the trading zone covered by 
the shippers and merchants based at or having a foothold in Lyon. The core of the Lugdunum-
based network covers the Rhône valley and northern Alps. It extends northwards to the Civitates 
of the Viromandui (Saint-Quentin), the Vangiones (Worms) and the Treveri (Trier), and 
westwards to the mouths of the Loire (Portus Namnetum) and the Civitas of the Veneti. The 
Ganuenta network stretches southwards into the area covered by the Lugdunese network to 
Vesontio (Besançon) in the Civitas of the Sequani and Augusta Rauricorum at the Rhine. 
Presumably both zones were connected also through the Seine river. But the main connecting 
node was Trier on the Moselle. It clearly manifests itself as a first order trading centre, whose 
mercantile elites were well established both in Lugdunum and Ganuenta and elsewhere in the 
German and Gallic provinces. If we extend the Ganuenta zone to Bordeaux, where the Treveran 
                                                     
120  CIL XIII, 8782. 
121  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, B 30 (Sumeronius Vitalis). 
122  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 7 (Agilius Secundus). 
123  Stuart and Bogaers 2001, A 5 (Iulius Aprilis). 
124  Petrikovits von 1985: 326. 
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negotiator Britannicianus, L. Solimarius Secundinus was active, the overlap increases via the 
Loire shippers, who are attested both in Lyon and in Nantes (Portus Namnetum).125 
A handful of transporter and merchant collectives are recorded in Germania Inferior, but 
they are not particularly prominent. In Forum Hadriani (Voorburg), capital of the Cananefates, 
c. 60 km north of Ganuenta, there was a collegium peregrinorum, that no doubt consisted 
mainly of resident merchants and/or their agents.126 A group of ‘Tungrian citizens and barge 
skippers residing in Factio’ (Vechten, c. 105 km from Ganuenta) dedicated an altar to the 
Goddess Viradectis but nothing suggests that this group was organized into a formal guild.127 
The Lyon-based trading zone, on the other hand, is characterized by numerous, formal and 
prestigious barge skipper and merchant guilds, such as the Nautae Ararici et Rhodanici (on 
Saône and Rhône), the Nautae Mosallici (Moselle), the Nautae Aruranci et Aramici (on the Aar 
and Aramus(?)), the Nautae Atricae et Ovidis (on the Ardèche and Ouvèze), the Nautae 
Druentici (the Durance), and many more. 
This contrast between both zones is too great to be caused (only) by source bias. It shows 
different institutional set-ups in both regions. The Ganuenta traders did not rely much on private 
formal associations, while those operating from Lyon and other centres in the river basins of 
Lugdunese and Narbonese Gaul and the western Alps did. The cause of this very different 
institutional set-up is unknown, but the massive presence of the Rhine armies—with whom the 
Ganuenta merchants clearly had close links—and therefore of Roman public authorities  may 
have been (partly) responsible. 
 
5. General Conclusions 
The three case studies discussed in this paper show how communities of long-distance traders 
in the Roman world differed in the degrees of control that individual traders were willing to 
delegate to collective institutions and offices. Strong formal associations (guilds) existed on 
Delos and in Puteoli but were not the dominant type of organization in either location. Cultural 
preferences played a part among Phoenician groups, who created formal institutions as early as 
the fourth century BC. Phoenicians were among the first to create formal associations at the 
free port of Delos. Their guilds were still active in the later second century AD at Puteoli. Baslez 
suggested that foreign merchants on Delos chose to establish more formal and permanent 
                                                     
125  CIL XIII, 1709; 3105; 3114; although in Lyon only via a patron, who was allectus arcae Galliarum; cf. 
Panciera 2006. 
126  CIL XIII, 8808. 
127  CIL XIII, 8815. 
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associations to attract more powerful patrons.128 But that does not explain why so few national 
or ethnic groups chose this option or why we do not find similar guild structures among the 
Ganuenta traders. Except for the ‘Alexandrian warehousemen’ foreign merchant guilds do not 
appear to have been local branches of home guilds. The dossier of the Tyrian stationarii 
suggests that Phoenician cities actively encouraged their merchants to establish stationes abroad 
and retained some measure of moral authority over them. Most mercantile communities with 
distinct cultural identities, however, only established religious institutions that structured the 
community informally. Religious beliefs, ceremonies and events gave these groups social 
cohesion, which stimulated the exchange of information and made social sanctions possible.  
Greek foreign businessmen on Delos, however, put confidence in the public authorities 
of their host town. In Puteoli, Roman law was the dominant institutional framework for 
transactions and it appears to have been relatively efficient by pre-industrial standards. The cult 
for Nehalennia and its temple attracted merchants from very diverse geographical backgrounds. 
Although the temple and the ceremonies and social events surrounding it no doubt stimulated 
general feelings of common identities and interests, the variety of backgrounds precludes the 
existence of a single strong merchant guild of ‘Nehalennia Worshippers’. We have no indication 
either that specific groups among the Ganuenta traders had formed their own guilds. By and 
large Roman long-distance trade relied on relatively efficient open access institutions and open 
markets. Of course, informal communities based on shared cultural identities and geographic 
origins stimulated relations of trust. Social networks among merchants no doubt favoured links 
between agents who shared cultural beliefs and national identities, but there was little need to 
formalize these into hierarchical associations and delegate control to chosen or appointed 
officers.  
This paper, however, has shown glimpses also of another side to this story. Strong and 
prestigious guilds of long-distance traders did exist. In some towns (like Ostia) or regions (like 
the great rivers valleys of the Gallic provinces and the cross-Alpine routes) they clearly did 
dominate trade. The reasons for this must be sought in local, regional and provincial conditions. 
We cannot generalize the existence or absence of formal guilds on the basis of local or regional 
cases. 
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T. Edridhe and M. Boer (eds), Hommages à M. J. Vermaseren, I. Leiden, Brill: 160–90. 
Bruneau, P. (1991) Encore le sanctuaire et les cultes des Poseidoniastes de Bérytos. Deliaca, 
IX, 67. Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique. 115: 377–88. 
Butcher, K. (2003) Roman Syria and the Near East. London/Los Angeles, British Museum 
Press. 
Camodeca, G. (1994) Puteoli porto annonario e il commercio del grano in età imperiale, in Le 
Ravitaillement en blé de Rome et des centres urbains des débuts de la République 
jusqu’au Haut-Empire. Actes du Colloque international de Naples (14-16 février 
1991).Collection Centre J. Bérard 11 and Collection de l'École française de Rome 196.. 
Naples/Rome: 103-28. 
Camodeca, G. (1999) Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum: TPSulp. : edizione critica 
dell’archivio puteolano dei Sulpicii. Rome. Edizioni Quasar.   
32 
 32 
Camodeca, G. (2000) Un « vicus Tyanianus » e i mestieri bancari a Puteoli: rilettura del 
graffito ercolanese CIL IV 10676. Ostraka 9.(2)2: 281–8. 
Camodeca, G. (2006) Communità di “peregrini” a Puteoli nei primi due secoli dell’imperio. 
In M. Bertinelli and A. Donati (eds), Le vie della storia. Migrazioni di popoli, viaggi di 
individui, circolazione di idee nel Mediterraneo antico (atti del II incontro 
internazionale di Storia Antica, Genova 2004). (Serta antiqua et mediaevalia 9). Rome, 
Giorgio di Bretschneider: 269-87.  
Coarelli, F. (1982) L’Agora des Italiens a Delo, il mercato degli schiavi?. In F. Coarelli, D. 
Musti and H. Solin (eds), Delo e l’Italia (Opuscula Institutum Romanum Finlandiae II). 
Rome, Bardi Editore: 119-45.  
Coarelli, F. (2005) L’ 'Agora des Italiens': lo statarion di Delo? Journal of Roman 
Archaeology 18: 196–212. 
Cocco, M. (1970) Sulla funzione dell’Agorà degli Italiani di Delo. Parola del Passato 25: 
446–9. 
Cohen, G.M. (2006) The Hellenistic Settlements in Syria, the Red Sea Basin, and North 
Africa. Berkeley, University of California Press.  
D’Arms, J.H. (1974) Puteoli in the second century of the Roman Empire: a social and 
economic study. Journal of Roman Studies 64: 104–24. 
De Clercq, W. (2009) Lokale gemeenschappen in het Imperium Romanum: transformaties in 
rurale bewoningsstructuur en materiële cultuur in de landschappen van het noordelijk 
deel van de civitas Menapiorum (provincie Gallia-Belgica, c. 100 v. Chr. - 400 n. Chr.). 
Ghent, University of Ghent.  
Demma, F. (2007) Monumenti pubblici di Puteoli: per un archeologia dell’architettura. 
Rome, L'Erma di Bretschneider.  
De Robertis, F.M. (1971) Storia delle corporazioni e del regime associativo nel mondo 
romano. Bari, Laterza.  
Dessi, R. and Ogilvie, S. (2003).  Social Capital and Collusion : The Case of Merchant 
Guilds, IDEI Working Paper 2003, http://ideas.repec.org/p/ide/wpaper/564.html  (last 
check 2018-01-02) 
Dhaeze, W. (2009) The military occupation along the coasts of Gallia Belgica and Germania 
Inferior, from ca. AD 170 to 275. In A. Morillo, N. Hanel and E. Martin (eds), Limes 
XX. Estudios sobre la frontera Romana. Roman Frontier Studies. Vol. 3. Anejos de 
Gladius 13. Madrid, CSIC: 1231-43. 
33 
 33 
Duff, P.W. (1938) Personality in Roman Private Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Edwards, J. and Ogilvie, S. (2012) Contract enforcement, institutions, and social capital: the 
Maghribi traders reappraised. Economic History Review 65.2: 421–44. 
Finley, M.I. (1999) The Ancient Economy. Updated with a new foreword by Ian Morris. 
Berkeley, University of California Press.  
Flambard, J.-M. (1981) Collegia Compitalicia; phénomène associatif, cadres territoriaux et 
cadres civiques dans le monde romain à l’époque républicaine. Ktèma 1981.VI: 144–23. 
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